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Introduction
Insurance fraud is prevalent throughout the world. According to Derrig (2002), while almost everyone is faced with the incentive to commit fraud opportunistically, fraud that is truly criminal is uncommon. Because humanity is opportunistic by nature, the designs of some insurance contracts could sometimes induce the motivation to defraud. Hence, while many studies are dedicated to exploring different kinds of fraud, some of them attempt to detect the signals of fraud​[1]​, while others start from the nature of the contract in order to find evidence of its existence​[2]​.
Some papers have found the empirical evidence in automobile insurance to support the existence of opportunistic fraud. For example, Dionne and Gagné (2001) found that the design of the deductibles may create an incentive to build up the claim, Dionne and Gagné (2002) provided evidence to show that the replacement cost endorsement could induce opportunistic fraud in automobile insurance, and Tzeng et al. (2011) also found that the automobile theft insured could defraud an insurer of a total theft claim to make up for their loss when their vehicles were actually flood-damaged and lacked typhoon/flood insurance coverage.
    In this paper, we find another aspect of opportunistic fraud in the contractual nature of automobile theft insurance market. In many automobile insurance markets, theft insurance covers only the total theft loss. The loss of accessories or spare parts will only be covered when an auto parts accessories endorsement policy is attached to the automobile theft insurance policy. However, a specific clause on automobiles stolen but recovered after searching could provide incentives for opportunistic fraud.
A clause on automobiles stolen but recovered after searching is designed as follows. When a claim on behalf of an insured vehicle is made on the basis of total theft but the vehicle is recovered after searching, the insurance company should be liable for the cost of repair or for reinstating any part of the vehicle thereof. The clause creates a loophole, and brings with it the incentive to defraud. When the insured encounters a partial automobile theft, if he (she) is only covered by the automobile theft insurance without having coverage for the auto parts accessories, he (she) could have an incentive to defraud by submitting a total theft claim. After the vehicle on which the claim for total theft was made is recovered after searching, the owner can obtain indemnity for the loss of spare parts and accessories.
    From our study sample, 87% of the theft claims are total theft claims, and about half of the overall amount can be recovered after searching. While the average amount paid in response to an unrecovered total theft claim is around 400,000 to 500,000 NT dollars, the average amount paid for a recovered total theft claim is around 100,000 NT dollars. The average payment amount for these recovered total theft claims happens to be around 10 percent of the value of a brand new vehicle, and approaches the amount of the cost of some of the valuable accessories in vehicles, such as the audio equipment.​[3]​ Such a phenomenon makes the insurance companies highly doubtful that there could be fraud within such kinds of claims, and the fraud may be induced by the nature of the insurance contract described above. In this paper, we intend to provide rigorous evidence to support the existence of opportunistic fraud in automobiles stolen but recovered after searching. 
We verify our inference using individual data from one large insurance company in Taiwan.​[4]​ The insurance company provides us with 1,702,059 observations based on automobile theft policies from the year 2002 to 2008. Over 90% of the insured only purchase automobile theft insurance without the endorsement that covers accessories. Within these observations, 0.46% of the insured encountered the total theft event. We only investigate the insured who filed a total theft claim, and this sub-set contains 7,770 observations.
Precluding the possibility of fraud first, whether a stolen vehicle would be recovered after searching is related to the thieves’ behavior. Thieves would not have information about the insurance coverage of their target vehicles, and they would also not concern themselves with that. Hence, the recovery rate of the stolen vehicles should be randomly distributed among different kinds of coverage. If not, there could be suspicions of fraud when the recovery rate of the stolen vehicles is particularly high among the group of policyholders that did not purchase an auto parts accessories endorsement policy. Accordingly, based on the sub-sample of the insured who filed total theft claims, we intend to test whether the conditional probability of recovery after searching is higher for the policyholders who do not purchase an auto parts accessories endorsement policy than for those who do purchase an endorsement policy for auto parts accessories. 
Since we assume that the policyholder is pretending that a partial theft is in fact a total theft in order to obtain indemnity for the partial loss, it is important to know whether the stolen car is recovered and how much is paid in response to the claims after the recovery takes place. Thus, when performing empirical tests, we observe the conditional correlation between the coverage and recovery rate within different intervals for claim amounts. Multinomial Logistic regression can be used to compare the probabilities of multi-categories of events with a counterpart. For the issue that we investigate, we segment the recovered stolen claim events into three different claim amount intervals: the intervals where the claim amount is below, around, or above the value of some valuable accessories in the vehicle. Hence, in the Multinomial Logistic regression, with the stolen vehicles which are never recovered after searching as the counterpart, we compare the conditional correlation between the recovery of vehicles after they have been reported stolen and the contract coverage among the different intervals of claim amounts. We expect that, in contrast to the un-recovered stolen vehicle, the recovered stolen vehicle tends to be without the coverage of the auto parts accessories endorsement. Compared to the higher or lower claim amounts, this conditional correlation is especially significant when the claim amount of these recovered stolen vehicles is around the value of the valuable accessories. 
The empirical results indicate that, when the claim amount ranges from 5 to 8 percent of the brand new vehicle’s value, the conditional recovery probability is significantly positively correlated with buying automobile theft insurance coverage without the endorsement policy for auto parts accessories. Beyond this claim amount interval, the conditional correlation is not significant. These results hold regardless of whether we control for the endogeneity of coverage choice or not.​[5]​ This evidence supports our finding that there emerges another opportunistic fraud induced by the loophole in the design of the insurance contract. It also coincides with the findings in the literature that fraud could be induced by some characteristic of the insurance contract.
    Our paper is organized as follows. The first part is the Introduction. In the second part, we describe our empirical sample, the preliminary observations regarding the phenomenon of fraud, and the empirical methodology that we adopt. The third part consists of the empirical results and their implications. Finally, the fourth part is our conclusion.



Data and methodology
    Using the data on automobile theft insurance policies provided by a large insurance company in Taiwan, our research sample focuses on insured with automobile theft insurance who have filed total theft claims during the research period, and whose vehicles included those that had been recovered as well as those that had not been recovered after searching. At the outset, we first compare this subset of our research sample with the whole sample in Table 2.
    The percentage of the insured who only purchased automobile theft insurance is similar between the full sample (91.38%) and our sub-sample (90.6%). In contrast to the whole sample, our sample also has a higher percentage of younger people who are aged between 25 and 30 years old, fewer females, and more medium-sized and newer (brand new and under 3 years old) vehicles. This means that the vehicles whose owners have previously filed for total theft tend to be largely concentrated in new medium-sized vehicles. Males and younger owners tend to be more likely to encounter automobile theft. Moreover, we can also see that the thefts are also inclined to be concentrated within some particular trademark.
    To preliminarily corroborate the suspicion of fraud, we further observe our research sample by separating the insured who have made these total theft claims into two groups: one group consists of those insured who only purchased automobile theft insurance, while the other group is made up of those insured who also extended their automobile theft insurance to the endorsement of auto parts and accessories. The descriptive statistics for these two sub-samples are listed in Table 3.
    Except for the differences in recovery probability and the claim amount, not too many structural differences exist for other characteristics of the insured and insured vehicles. The probability of recovery in the sub-sample for which the insured have automobile theft insurance only is 0.4656, and is higher than for the other sub-sample in which the insured also extended their coverage to auto parts and accessories, and for which the recovery probability is only 0.2918. In addition, in the former sub-sample, for which the average claim amount is 236,372 NT dollars, the average claim amount for the latter sub-sample is 274,812 NT dollars. Since simply observing the slight differences in average claim amounts cannot give us too much intuition, we further check the average claim amounts for the recovered vehicles within these two sub-samples. The amount in the former group is only 93,602 NT dollars, and is close to 10% of the value of a brand new vehicle. This amount in the latter group is 219,269 NT dollars, which is over 40% of the value of a brand new vehicle. The former approaches the cost of reinstating valuable accessories such as the audio equipment within a vehicle. According to our story regarding opportunistic fraud, this observation gives us a preliminary idea that fraud could in fact exist.
    We can not infer the existence of opportunistic fraud simply based on the above preliminary observations. Among these total theft claims, a formal test of the correlation between the recovery of stolen vehicles and the insurance contract coverage after controlling for all related characteristics is needed. For the purpose of investigating this correlation separately according to different payment amounts, we use Multinomial Logistic regression. The sub-group of stolen vehicles which were not recovered is treated as the counter group. The comparison groups are separated into three sub-samples, and their payment amounts are controlled as being above, as being equal to, or as being below the value of valuable accessories that amount from 5 to 8 percent of the value of the vehicle when brand new. The Multinomial Logistic regressions are:
    (1)
 when the totally stolen vehicle is not recovered after searching.  when the payment amount of the recovered stolen vehicle is below 5 percent of the value of a brand new vehicle.  when the payment amount of the recovered stolen vehicle is from 5 percent to 8 percent of the brand new vehicle’s value.  when the payment amount of the recovered stolen vehicle is above 8 percent of the brand new vehicle’s value.  means that the insured has only automobile theft insurance coverage and does not have coverage for auto parts accessories.  means that the insured not only has automobile theft insurance coverage, but also has extended coverage for automobile parts accessories.  is the vector of explanatory variables which includes the characteristics of the insured and the insured vehicles. These characteristics are used for the underwriting or pricing of automobile theft insurance. They are listed in Table 1. , ,  are the corresponding estimated coefficients and coefficient vectors.
We predict that the opportunistic fraud could be induced by the stipulation in automobile theft insurance. The insured who did not extend the coverage to auto parts accessories and actually encountered a partial theft have an incentive to pretend that their vehicles encountered total theft. The intention is to be indemnified after waiting for the claimed lost vehicles to be recovered. The key estimated coefficient used to explain the above prediction is . This coefficient in each sub-group regression is explained in contrast to the counter group in which case the stolen vehicle is never recovered. If  is positive (negative) and significantly different from 0, the insured whose stolen vehicle is recovered after searching and whose payment amount is within the  group has a higher (lower) probability of choosing a single automobile theft insurance contract (without coverage for parts and accessories) than the insured whose stolen vehicles are not recovered. 
Meanwhile, the intention of these opportunists with insurance is merely to get the lost auto parts indemnity while not having coverage for the auto parts accessories. The fraudulent vehicle owner will usually not gamble too much when exhibiting opportunistic behavior. Hence, we can expect there to be a positive relationship between the probability of recovery and the probability of choosing only automobile theft insurance which could be strongly related to the claim amount. Furthermore, the claim amount should approach the value of some valuable auto accessories, such as audio equipment…etc., which account for around 5 percent to 8 percent of the brand new vehicle’s price. According to our prediction,  should be positive and significantly different from 0. As for the coefficients  and , their significance and sign are undetermined.
If the determination of the choice of insurance contract and the probability of recovering the stolen vehicle gives rise to the endogeneity problem, we use another approach to test the conditional correlation between the recovery of the stolen vehicle and the choice of contract. The methodology used is the two-stage method that is similar to the methodology in Dionne et al. (2001).
    In the first stage, we use Logistic regression to estimate the probability of choice of coverage for those vehicles for which a total theft claim has been made:
      (2)
The logarithm of the odds ratio for the choice of coverage is explained by the above regression.  is the probability of choosing a single automobile theft insurance contract.  is the vector of explanatory variables which includes the same characteristics as in regressions (1).  is the corresponding estimated vector of coefficients.
    We also perform the Multinomial Logistic regression in the second stage. The counter group and the comparison groups are identical in terms of their definitions in relation to regressions (1). 
  (3)
The estimated probability of coverage choice  is estimated and recorded from equation (2) in the first stage. The key coefficient we use for testing the conditional correlation is also , . According to opportunistic fraud, we only predict that  should be positive and significantly different from 0, which means that when the stolen vehicle is recovered and the amount of the payment ranges from 5% to 8% of the brand new vehicle value, the probability of the coverage of the insurance contract is higher in the case where there is only automobile theft insurance than in the case where the insured’s stolen vehicle is not recovered.


Empirical results
    The empirical results are listed in Table 4 and Table 5. In Table 4, the results correspond to the Multinomial Logistic regressions without considering the endogeneity problem in equation (1). In Table 5, the results are those for the Multinomial Logistic regressions from the second stage of the two-stage method where the problem of endogeneity is considered.
    When we do not take the problem of endogeneity into account, as in Table 4, only the estimated coefficient of  in the sub-group where the payment amount ranges from 5 percent to 8 percent of the brand new vehicle value is 0.1816, which is positive and significantly different from 0 at a confidence level close to 95%. The empirical results tell us that, in comparison with the stolen vehicles which were not recovered, for the recovered vehicles there were higher probabilities of choosing single automobile theft insurance when the payment amount ranged from 5% to 8% of the brand new vehicle value. The implication behind this empirical result shows that, among the insured who have claimed total theft, those whose vehicles have been recovered after search tend to have only purchased single automobile theft insurance in comparison with the ones whose vehicles have never been recovered. This is especially true when the payment amount is around the value of the valuable accessories that are within the vehicle. This phenomenon is also coincidental with the predictions of opportunistic fraud. Some opportunistic insured who are not covered by auto parts accessories insurance and who unfortunately encounter partial theft will seek indemnity by pretending they encountered total theft while waiting for recovery, and in this way they can be reimbursed for their loss of accessories and repairs.
    Through these estimated results, we further compare the recovery rate, when the claim amount is limited to ranging from 5% to 8% of the vehicle’s value brand new, between the insured who only purchased the automobile theft insurance and the insured who also extended the coverage to auto parts accessories.​[6]​ We find that, when the claim amount of the recovery falls within the above interval, the recovery rate of the former group of insured is 5.43% higher than that of the latter group who are insured on the basis that the average recovery rate is 6.77%.
    This outcome may also be disentangled from adverse selection or advantageous selection, and ex ante moral hazard. In automobile theft insurance, the above mentioned asymmetric information problems test the relationship between coverage and theft risk instead of the risk of recovery or no recovery. Hence, while the conditional correlation between coverage choice and the possibility of recovery sustains our prediction of opportunistic fraud, this conclusion is definitely distinguished from the other asymmetric information problems.
    When we take the endogeneity problem into account, in Table 5, only the estimated coefficient of  in the sub-group where the payment amount ranges from 5 percent to 8 percent of the brand new vehicle value is both positive and significantly different from 0 with a confidence level close to 95%. The value of this estimated coefficient is 0.1539. It is for the other two sub-groups where the payment amount is out of this range that the estimated coefficients of  are significantly different from 0. These results mean that, in comparison with the result where the stolen vehicles are not recovered, except for the case where the payment amount is within the range from 5% to 8% of the brand new vehicle value, there is no asymmetric information between the insurance contract choice and the risk of not recovering after researching when and if the insured vehicle was stolen. In contrast to the vehicles which were not recovered, the stolen and recovered vehicles have higher probabilities that they were only covered by a single automobile theft insurance contract instead of also extending their coverage to auto parts accessories.
    On the condition that the claim amount of the recovery events ranges from 5% to 8% of the brand new vehicle’s value, we also further calculate the value of the increased probability that the insured who only purchased automobile theft insurance compared to that of the counter group of insured. This is found to be 4.82%, which is similar to the results without controlling for the endogeneity problem.​[7]​
When this residual correlation emerges only when the payment amount is around the value of the valuable accessories for the vehicle (i.e., from 5% to 8% of the vehicle’s value), we could infer this as being evidence of opportunistic fraud. The opportunistic insured, without the coverage for their accessories, tend to pretend that their vehicles were totally stolen and wait for their vehicles to be recovered after searching when their vehicles actually only encountered partial theft. They can still obtain indemnity for their recovered vehicles to cover the accessories and repair expenses. This amount is only around 5% to 8% of the brand new vehicle’s value.
One thing worth mentioning is that we can observe the coefficient on the variable of estimated coverage choice () as having a high estimated value and being significantly different from zero from the first stage. This seems to reveal the information that not only are there insured who would exhibit ex post opportunistic behavior after their vehicles really encountered partial theft, but there are also insured who would ex ante have planned to adopt opportunistic behavior if their vehicle would really have been partially stolen later. Furthermore, this ex ante thought will make them unwilling to extend their coverage to include auto parts accessories when they purchase automobile theft insurance.


Conclusion
    Fraud arises because human beings are opportunistic. Fraud could be induced by some characteristics of the insurance contract. This paper indicates that a clause in the insurance contract could create the loophole to induce fraud.
    The clause stipulates that the insurance company should be reliable for the reinstatement or repair cost of the recovered vehicle on behalf of which the insured had made a claim for total theft. This creates an incentive for the insured who purchased only automobile theft insurance to defraud when they actually only encounter a partial theft claim.
    The way we identify this kind of opportunistic fraud is by comparing the insurance contracts of the insured whose stolen vehicles were recovered with those of the insured whose stolen vehicles were not recovered. The empirical evidence supports our opportunistic fraud prediction that the insured who pretend to have encountered total theft are the insured who purchased single automobile theft insurance, and would tend to let their “stolen” vehicle be recovered after searching. What is particularly worth mentioning is that because this kind of fraud is only one kind of opportunistic behavior, they do not focus too much on the amount of the payment. Instead, they only target the amount of their partial theft loss. Hence, the evidence of opportunistic fraud only emerges when the payment amount is around the value of the valuable auto parts accessories, i.e., it ranges from 5% to 8% of the brand new vehicle’s value.
    When we consider that the determination of coverage choice could be related to the probability of the vehicle being recovered after being stolen, we identify the opportunistic fraud through the conditional correlation between contract coverage and the possibility of recovery. We find that the possibility of the vehicle being recovered after being stolen is strongly positively correlated with the possibility of choosing a single automobile theft insurance contract when the payment amount is around the value of the valuable auto parts accessories. This empirical result rules out the possibility of adverse selection or ex ante moral hazard, and supports the existence of opportunistic fraud.
    This paper sympathizes with the inference in the literature that some characteristics of the insurance contract could induce the incentive to defraud. We contribute to the empirical literature by finding another new example of opportunistic fraud which is induced by the loophole in the clause on automobile theft insurance in Taiwan.
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Table 1  Definitions of variables
Variables 	Definition
coverage_s	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured purchases the automobile theft insurance only (without extending it to auto parts and accessories), and 0 otherwise.
recovery	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the total theft insured vehicle has been recovered after searching, and 0 otherwise.
ttclm	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured has previously filed a total theft claim, and 0 otherwise.
clmamt	The claim amount for those insured who have previously filed a total theft claim
clm_per	The percentage of the claim amount over the value of the brand new vehicle
age2530	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 25 and 30, and 0 otherwise.
age3060	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is between the ages of 30 and 60, and 0 otherwise.
ageabove60	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is above 60 years old, and 0 otherwise.
sexf	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is female, and 0 otherwise.
marria_	A dummy variable that equals 1 if the insured is married, and 0 otherwise.
veh_s	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured car has an engine capacity that equals or is under 1800 c.c., and 0 otherwise.
veh_m	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the insured car has an engine capacity between 1800 c.c. and 2000 c.c., and 0 otherwise.
tramak_q	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the vehicle is brand q, q=n, f, h, t, c, and 0 otherwise.
carage_0	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is under one year old, and 0 otherwise.
carage_1	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is one year old, and 0 otherwise.
carage_2	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is two years old, and 0 otherwise.
carage_3	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is three years old, and 0 otherwise.
carage_4	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is four years old, and 0 otherwise.
carage_5	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is five years old, and 0 otherwise.
sedan	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is a sedan and is for non-commercial or for long-term rental purposes, and 0 otherwise.
city	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the owner of the car lives in a city, and 0 otherwise.
north	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the north of Taiwan, and 0 otherwise.
south	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the south of Taiwan, and 0 otherwise.
east	A dummy variable that equals 1 when the car is registered in the east of Taiwan, and 0 otherwise.



Table 2   The descriptive statistics of the whole sample and sub-sample
of the total theft claim
	Whole sample	Our research sample
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
coverage_s	0.9138	0.2806	0.9060	0.2918
recovery			0.4493	0.4975
ttclm	0.0046	0.0674		
age2530	0.0674	0.2507	0.1320	0.3386
age3060	0.8743	0.3315	0.7988	0.4009
ageabove60	0.0472	0.2122	0.0310	0.1734
sexf	0.6300	0.4828	0.5887	0.4921
married	0.8993	0.3009	0.8722	0.3339
veh_s	0.4987	0.5000	0.4360	0.4959
veh_m	0.3443	0.4751	0.4315	0.4953
tramak_n	0.0053	0.0728	0.0053	0.0725
tramak_f	0.1000	0.2999	0.0689	0.2532
tramak_h	0.0759	0.2648	0.1752	0.3801
tramak_t	0.4110	0.4920	0.3337	0.4716
tramak_c	0.0787	0.2693	0.0958	0.2943
carage_0	0.2058	0.4043	0.3018	0.4591
carage_1	0.1524	0.3595	0.1730	0.3782
carage_2	0.1317	0.3382	0.1467	0.3538
carage_3	0.1172	0.3217	0.1198	0.3248
carage_4	0.1021	0.3028	0.0978	0.2971
carage_5	0.0828	0.2756	0.0668	0.2497
sedan	0.9530	0.2116	0.9606	0.1945
city	0.5396	0.4984	0.5439	0.4981
north	0.4881	0.4999	0.4505	0.4976
south	0.2743	0.4462	0.2763	0.4472
east	0.0233	0.1509	0.0142	0.1181
No. of observations	1702059	7770



Table 3   The descriptive statistics for group_s (the total theft claim insured who only purchased automobile theft insurance) and group_e (the total theft claim insured who also extended their automobile theft insurance to the endorsement of auto parts and accessories)
	Group_s	Group_e
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
recovery	0.4656	0.4970	0.2918	0.3003
clmamt	236372	246545	274812	396941
clm_per	0.2864	0.2673	0.3210	0.2761
age2530	0.1320	0.3385	0.1329	0.3397
age3060	0.7990	0.4008	0.7973	0.4023
ageabove60	0.0318	0.1755	0.0233	0.1509
sexf	0.5930	0.4913	0.5466	0.4982
married	0.8717	0.3344	0.8767	0.3290
veh_s	0.4469	0.4972	0.3315	0.4711
veh_m	0.4259	0.4945	0.4863	0.5002
tramak_n	0.0051	0.0713	0.0068	0.0825
tramak_f	0.0702	0.2555	0.0562	0.2304
tramak_h	0.1614	0.3679	0.3082	0.4621
tramak_t	0.3533	0.4780	0.1452	0.3525
tramak_c	0.0973	0.2964	0.0808	0.2727
carage_0	0.3048	0.4604	0.2726	0.4456
carage_1	0.1713	0.3768	0.1890	0.3918
carage_2	0.1456	0.3527	0.1575	0.3646
carage_3	0.1196	0.3245	0.1219	0.3274
carage_4	0.0983	0.2977	0.0932	0.2908
carage_5	0.0661	0.2484	0.0740	0.2619
sedan	0.9607	0.1944	0.9603	0.1954
city	0.5425	0.4982	0.5575	0.4970
north	0.4608	0.4985	0.3507	0.4775
south	0.2760	0.4470	0.2795	0.4490
east	0.0149	0.1212	0.0068	0.0825
No. of observations	7040	730



Table 4   The estimated results of the Multinomial Logistic Regression — Without controlling for the endogeneity problem
Parameter	k=1	k=2	k=3
Intercept_k	0.4237 (0.0989)	-1.9398 (<0.0001)	-15.7903 (0.9006)
coverage_k	-0.1298 (0.1587)	0.1816 (0.0136)	0.0899 (0.6730)
age2530_k	0.2131 (0.2808)	0.1599 (0.6141)	-0.0432 (0.8118)
age3060_k	0.3348 (0.0723)	0.1279 (0.6695)	-0.0344 (0.8396)
ageabove60_k	0.1910 (0.4498)	-0.1190 (0.7811)	-0.2639 (0.2900)
sexf_k	0.0365 (0.5739)	0.1683 (0.1327)	0.0259 (0.6900)
married_k	0.1145 (0.2594)	0.1202 (0.4907)	0.2922 (0.0051)
veh_s_k	-0.2400 (0.0183)	-0.2182 (0.2328)	-0.2560 (0.0191)
veh_m_k	0.1559 (0.1151)	0.0665 (0.7089)	0.2361 (0.0264)
tramak_n_k	0.3983 (0.3601)	0.5742 (0.3953)	0.7751 (0.0645)
tramak_f_k	-0.5976 (<0.0001)	-0.2546 (0.2651)	-0.1542 (0.2385)
tramak_h_k	0.0335 (0.7186)	0.6412 (<0.0001)	0.6395 (<0.0001)
tramak_t_k	0.463 (<0.0001)	0.8696 (<0.0001)	0.4284 (<0.0001)
tramak_c_k	-0.2714 (0.0147)	-0.6936 (0.0028)	-0.5415 (<0.0001)
carage_0_k	-1.2232 (<0.0001)	-1.3108 (<0.0001)	-0.2971 (0.0245)
carage_1_k	1.0153 (<0.0001)	1.0533 (<0.0001)	0.0748 (0.5897)
carage_2_k	0.9577 (<0.0001)	0.7275 (0.0001)	0.2446 (0.0894)
carage_3_k	0.6228 (<0.0001)	0.8351 (<0.0001)	0.1868 (0.1955)
carage_4_k	0.6913 (<0.0001)	0.7450 (0.0007)	0.3564 (0.0157)
carage_5_k	0.3225 (0.0256)	0.6380 (0.0107)	0.5901 (0.0002)
sedan_k	-0.2780 (0.0885)	0.1414 (0.6873)	-0.5409 (0.0012)
city_k	-0.0543 (0.3927)	-0.1926 (0.0781)	0.1869 (0.0038)
north_k	0.3750 (<0.0001)	0.1900 (0.1404)	0.9445 (<0.0001)
south_k	0.0997 (0.2421)	0.3428 (0.0208)	0.2176 (0.0252)
east_k	-0.0633 (0.8161)	-0.3695 (0.3133)	-0.0584 (0.847)
Note: The whole sample is focused on the insured who claim a total theft. The counter group is the sub-sample which includes the insured whose stolen vehicles were never recovered. The three comparison groups include: “k=1”: which is the sub-group for which the insured vehicles were recovered and the payment amount is below 5% of the value of a brand new vehicle. “k=2”: which is the sub-group for which the insured vehicles were recovered and the payment amount ranges from 5% to 8% of the value of a brand new vehicle. “k=3”: which is the sub-group for which the insured vehicles were recovered and the payment amount is above 8% of the value of a brand new vehicle.


Table 5   The estimated results of the Multinomial Logistic Regression — Controlling for the endogeneity problem
Parameter	k=1	k=2	k=3
Intercept_k	-0.5916 (0.1561)	-17.7556 (<0.0001)	-30.0008 (0.8115)
	3.6644 (0.0977)	19.2300 (<0.0001)	17.2722 (0.0007)
coverage_k	-0.1395 (0.1303)	0.1539 (0.0510)	0.0453 (0.8318)
age2530_k	0.2135 (0.2876)	0.0362 (0.9108)	-0.3019 (0.1050)
age3060_k	0.3347 (0.0731)	0.0860 (0.7748)	-0.1143 (0.5053)
ageabove60_k	0.1980 (0.4537)	-0.3908 (0.3875)	-0.8287 (0.0017)
sexf_k	0.0387 (0.5838)	0.0717 (0.5594)	-0.1775 (0.0122)
married_k	0.1164 (0.2520)	0.1289 (0.4604)	0.3051 (0.0036)
veh_s_k	-0.2427 (0.1661)	-0.7167 (0.0207)	-1.2795 (<0.0001)
veh_m_k	0.1527 (0.2389)	-0.2206 (0.3288)	-0.3371 (0.0102)
tramak_n_k	0.4046 (0.3545)	0.4716 (0.4872)	0.5882 (0.1660)
tramak_f_k	-0.6150 (0.0002)	-0.5903 (0.0339)	-0.8722 (<0.0001)
tramak_h_k	0.0587 (0.7230)	1.1193 (<0.0001)	1.6434 (<0.0001)
tramak_t_k	0.8787 (<0.0001)	1.5079 (<0.0001)	1.7942 (<0.0001)
tramak_c_k	-0.2826 (0.0629)	-1.0660 (0.0003)	-1.3410 (<0.0001)
carage_0_k	-1.2251 (<0.0001)	-1.1269 (<0.0001)	0.1035 (0.4719)
carage_1_k	1.0214 (<0.0001)	0.7850 (0.0012)	0.5048 (0.0017)
carage_2_k	0.9626 (<0.0001)	0.4979 (0.0267)	0.2535 (0.1133)
carage_3_k	0.6227 (<0.0001)	0.7192 (0.0009)	0.4364 (0.0035)
carage_4_k	0.6905 (<0.0001)	0.6561 (0.0033)	0.5459 (0.0003)
carage_5_k	0.3232 (0.0310)	0.4977 (0.0558)	0.8944 (<0.0001)
sedan_k	0.2786 (0.0904)	0.2210 (0.5323)	0.3921 (0.0206)
city_k	-0.0550 (0.3878)	-0.1812 (0.0979)	0.2139 (0.0010)
north_k	0.3982 (0.0272)	-0.3635 (0.2536)	-0.2808 (0.1201)
south_k	0.0906 (0.4836)	0.6742 (0.0027)	0.9325 (<0.0001)
east_k	-0.0527 (0.8850)	-0.4896 (0.3967)	-1.8657 (<0.0001)
Note: The whole sample is focused on the insured who claim a total theft. The counter group is the sub-sample which includes the insured whose stolen vehicles were never recovered. The three comparison groups include) “k=1”: which is the sub-group for which the insured vehicles were recovered and the payment amount is less than 5% of the value of a brand new vehicle. “k=2”: which is the sub-group for which the insured vehicles were recovered and the payment amount is from 5% to 8% of the value of a brand new vehicle. “k=3”: which is the sub-group that the insured vehicles were recovered and the payment amount is above 8% of the value of a brand new vehicle.
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^1	  Derrig (2002), Artis et al. (2002), Brockett et al. (2002), Major and Riedinger (2002), Viaene et al. (2002), and Caudill et al. (2005) explore many techniques of fraud detection. Tennyson and Salsas-Forn (2002) integrate the concepts of detection and deterrence.
^2	  Cummins and Tennyson (1992, 1996), Tennyson (1997), Carroll and Abrahamse (2001), and Dionne and Gagné (2001, 2002) have examined fraud in the automobile insurance market. Dionne and St-Michel (1991), and Butler et al. (1996) looked at fraud in workers’ compensation insurance, while Dionne (1984), Sparrow (1996), and Hyman (2001, 2002) examined the health care fraud problem.
^3	  The value of the valuable accessories in vehicles is around 7% of the vehicles’ value.
^4	  The insurance company we investigated has a market share of 20% of Taiwan’s automobile insurance market.
^5	  If the opportunistic fraud behavior was only engaged in after the insurance contract had been purchased and after the theft event had occurred, we do not think the decision regarding the choice of contract would have been related to the probability of the vehicle being recovered after being stolen. Then, no endogeneity problem is found to exist. However, if the opportunistic fraud behavior had been considered while the individual was making the decision to choose the contract, the endogeneity problem exists and should be controlled.
^6	  According to the estimated Multinomial Logistic regression in Table 4, we calculated the estimated recovery rate for the insured who only purchased automobile theft insurance, and found it to be 0.0731. We also calculated the estimated recovery rate for the insured who further extended the coverage to auto parts accessories. It was found to be 0.0188. The difference between them is 0.0543, and it is significant on the basis of the 99% confidence level.
^7	  According to the estimated Multinomial Logistic regression in Table 5, we calculated the estimated recovery rate for the insured who only purchased automobile theft insurance, and found it to be 0.0695. We also calculated the estimated recovery rate for the insured who further extended their coverage to auto parts accessories, and that was found to be 0.0213. The difference between them is 0.0482, and it is significant on the basis of the 99% confidence level.
